After losing four times the revenue in two years, the early cancer screening company Amisen makes another attempt at the Hong Kong Stock Exchange

Annual revenue is only in the tens of millions, yet net losses are nearly RMB 50 million; Wuhan Aimesen Life Science and Technology Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Aimesen”) is once again rushing toward the Hong Kong Stock Exchange with these results that are still loss-making. After its prospectus expired, on April 7, Aimesen resubmitted a listing application to the Main Board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. This cancer early screening company, founded ten years ago, already holds several Class III medical device products approved by the National Medical Products Administration, but its commercialization performance has not been ideal. In 2024 and 2025, the company’s revenue totaled only a little over RMB 22 million, while losses cumulatively approached RMB 90 million. What’s more, within this limited revenue, a significant portion has also come from related-party transactions.

In addition, the “early screening” narrative that Aimesen emphasizes appears to diverge from regulatory definitions. There are voices in the market questioning that the registered intended use of its products is “detection” or “assisted diagnosis,” rather than early screening for healthy people. From reliance on related parties to unclear positioning, whether Aimesen can break the deadlock with an IPO remains unknown.

Years in, still stuck in the losses

Aimesen’s latest prospectus shows that although it has been deeply involved in the cancer detection track for more than a decade, over the past two years Aimesen’s revenue has remained only at the tens-of-millions scale. In 2024 and 2025 respectively, the company recorded operating revenue of RMB 7.238 million and RMB 15.419 million.

In sharp contrast to its limited revenue is continuously expanding losses. From 2024 to 2025, Aimesen’s net losses were RMB 38.63 million and RMB 48.979 million respectively, with cumulative losses of nearly RMB 90 million—about four times the total revenue in the same period. Even if 2025 revenue doubled, the loss amount still increased by 26.79% year over year.

In terms of growth drivers, the doubling of revenue in 2025 mainly relied on concentrated volume after new products were approved. In September 2024, the colorectal cancer detection product Aichangjian was approved by the National Medical Products Administration; in January 2025, the liver cancer detection product Aixin gan and the esophageal cancer detection product Aisin ning were approved and launched one after another. As sales revenue from the three products increased, overall performance grew directly.

In its product portfolio, Aimesen has built a detection matrix covering multiple cancer types. Several products have obtained Class III medical device registration certificates from the National Medical Products Administration. Currently, commercialization revenue mainly comes from Aichangkang, Aichangjian, Aisin ning, and Aixin gan.

A reporter from Beijing Business Daily noticed that Aichangkang was once the revenue pillar of Aimesen, contributing 72.2% of revenue in 2024. However, in 2025, Aimesen’s revenue structure changed significantly. The revenue share of Aichangkang fell to 29.7%, while the revenue shares of three products—Aichangjian, Aisin ning, and Aixin gan—rose to 18.4%, 15%, and 29.1% respectively.

Deng Yong, a professor and doctoral supervisor at Beijing University of Chinese Medicine on health law, said that Aimesen’s profitability predicament is not caused by technical shortcomings, but rather the result of a comprehensive deviation in the commercialization path combined with strategic positioning mistakes. The company has a globally first qPCR methylation detection product; the technology has certain barriers. The layout of Class III certificates also reflects its R&D foundation. But the product launch timeline lagged badly. When its core colorectal cancer detection product was approved, the race track had already been taken up by companies such as Nuohui Health and Aide, losing the first-mover advantage. At the same time, product pricing is too high and medical insurance coverage is limited; direct sales and distribution channel development has lagged, leaving terminal selling capabilities weak. More importantly, R&D, sales, and management expenses have remained invested at a high level, while the revenue scale cannot cover costs at all, causing losses to expand year by year, with large-scale profitable growth still nowhere in sight.

Regarding relevant issues, a reporter from Beijing Business Daily sent an interview letter to Aimesen, but as of the time of publication, no reply had been received.

Insufficient market expansion, relying on internal “capital infusion”

With the revenue scale already not large, Aimesen’s sales revenue has also been highly dependent on related-party transactions, and the authenticity and independence of its revenue have drawn significant attention.

Aimesen’s prospectus shows that Wuhan Ainuo Medical Laboratory (hereinafter “Ainuo Laboratory”) is the company’s core related party. It is wholly owned by Zhang Lianglu, an executive director and controlling shareholder, and primarily engages in medical testing and contract research services. In 2024 and 2025, Ainuo Laboratory was Aimesen’s first and second-largest customer, respectively. In 2024, the transaction amount reached RMB 3.774 million, accounting for 52.1% of total revenue for that year, contributing more than half of revenue.

In addition to Ainuo Laboratory, another major customer of Aimesen is Cape Bio. Cape Bio is not only an important cooperation partner for Aimesen, but also holds 11.58% equity in Aimesen. According to disclosures in the prospectus, Cape Bio is held 61% by Guangdong Cape Bio, and in 2024, Guangdong Cape Bio was Aimesen’s third-largest customer, with transaction amount accounting for 5.2% of total revenue. Just these two related-party counterparties together contributed nearly 60% of revenue.

Deng Yong believes this is essentially the absorption of products within the shareholder system, rather than real recognition from the third-party market. This revenue structure directly exposes the company’s serious lack of capability to expand through market channels, relying on “capital infusion” from shareholders to maintain revenue growth.

Deng Yong further pointed out that this model hides three layers of risk. First, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange’s strict review of whether related-party transaction pricing is fair and whether there is any transfer of benefits could become a stumbling block to listing. Second, if related-party transactions are normalized and reduced after listing, revenue is likely to drop sharply, casting doubt on the company’s ability to continue operating. Third, investors will value the company based on real revenue after deducting related-party transactions; the company’s valuation would shrink significantly, completely losing its appeal to capital markets.

A reporter from Beijing Business Daily noticed that by 2025, the share of Aimesen’s related-party transactions had declined somewhat. The transaction amount with Ainuo Laboratory fell to RMB 2.656 million, accounting for 17.2%, while Guangdong Cape Bio was no longer included among the top five customers before 2025.

Early screening or assisted diagnosis?

For companies like Aimesen, the growth space of the core business is the focus of attention from the capital market. The “cancer early screening” narrative that Aimesen promotes to the outside is precisely the core logic behind its appeal to investors, but this positioning has been heavily questioned by the market since the first prospectus submission.

According to registration information from the National Medical Products Administration, Aimesen has currently obtained five Class III medical device certificates, covering multiple sample types such as blood and urine, and targeting the detection of multiple cancers including liver cancer and colorectal cancer. Previously, there were claims that the intended use of Aimesen’s approved products is for “detection” or “assisted diagnosis” of specific cancers, rather than strictly “screening.” This also means that at its current stage, the main service recipients for Aimesen are people who “have already shown symptoms,” rather than ordinary people who “actively undergo preventive health screening.”

Zhu Mingjun, an analyst in the pharmaceutical industry, told a reporter from Beijing Business Daily that if the product purposes are only for assisted diagnosis, the market space would be greatly narrowed. Assisted diagnosis covers only suspected cases among people who seek medical care, while early screening targets the vast population without symptoms—orders of magnitude different in scale. In addition, valuation logic would be restructured: early screening would be viewed as a consumer-level market, with valuation multiples far higher than traditional IVD products. The commercialization path would also be limited, making it difficult to promote directly to physical examination centers and among healthy people.

It is understood that currently, relatively few products in China have obtained approval for “cancer early screening” intended use. Among them are Nuohui Health’s colorectal cancer early screening products Changweiqing and Mierui’s Mixiaowei, among others. Changweiqing once saw explosive growth in the early stage after its launch. However, the once prominent “first cancer early screening stock,” Nuohui Health, was forced to delist at the end of October 2025 due to financial fraud.

More worth noting is that the regulatory threshold for cancer early screening is also being continuously raised. In August 2025, the National Medical Products Administration’s Center for Medical Device Evaluation released the “Clinical Evaluation Registration and Review Guidance Principles for In Vitro Diagnostic Reagents for Cancer Screening.” The document clearly states that the subjects for cancer screening products are asymptomatic populations, and it requires the applying companies to select no fewer than three clinical trial institutions to carry out multicenter clinical trials. This undoubtedly increases the difficulty of Aimesen’s future product positioning.

Deng Yong said that with this submission, although Aimesen has submitted short-term data showing doubled revenue, the core problems have not changed. For a company that has spent ten years sharpening its sword yet still “can’t get going,” listing is not the endpoint. If related-party transactions are not thoroughly cut off, the commercialization system is not rebuilt, and product positioning is not clarified, even if it successfully lists on the Hong Kong market, it will still be difficult to escape the quagmire of long-term losses, and it will also be unable to meet capital market expectations.

Beijing Business Daily reporter Wang Yinhao Song Yuying