Strait of Hormuz "Stimulating Investigation": Half of the Traffic Volume Missing from Public Data

Today’s most “explosive” piece of material in the financial world comes from an on-the-ground report about the Strait of Hormuz.

Previously, the research institution Citrini Research, which sparked a storm in the market—and even “broke” the stock prices of a batch of related companies—with its AI “thought experiment” report《2028 年全球智能危机》, has now put forward another heavyweight geopolitical brief.

It has created quite a stir among traders, maritime shipping insurance, and energy research circles, and the reason is simple: while the market debates whether the strait “is open at all” and whether it could “suddenly close,” this report pulls the discussion straight back to the scene.

The main character is the mysterious “Analyst No. 3” from Citrini Research. Unlike the usual kind of secondary compilation, he chooses to go to the area near the strait himself—“counting ships,” observing shipping lanes, talking with locals and crew on site—and documenting the inspection, detention, and risk details encountered along the way.

A common first reaction from many readers after finishing the piece is: this feels more like a battlefield reconnaissance log than a macro commentary produced in an office—and that’s exactly the kind of jolt Citrini has consistently delivered, using details to drag the market back to reality.

In his on-site observations, “Analyst No. 3” found that the number of vessels actually transiting the Strait of Hormuz is clearly higher than the level shown by publicly available AIS data, meaning the market systematically underestimates real traffic. The key numbers in the report are jarring—“Under current conditions, the AIS system fails to report about 50% of actual passing vessels each day.”

More importantly, he describes the strait’s current situation as a form of “dynamic enforcement.” The strait is not well summarized by a binary label like “open/closed,” because the on-site rules are changing, and so are the enforcers.

The report writes that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is driving new “who can pass” rules on site. Patrol boats and Shahed drones operate frequently, and the potential for volatility risks to ripple through the global oil and gas supply chain could be amplified at any time.

How to fill the information gap: on-site “counting ships” is the most direct solution

The Strait of Hormuz is like a “master valve” for global energy.

For years, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) has estimated that the Strait of Hormuz carries a substantial share of the world’s seaborne crude oil and petroleum products flows (often cited at a level around roughly two-tenths). Any news that “gets the open/closed status wrong” would quickly show up in oil prices, freight rates, and insurance premium rates.

The problem is that the tools the market commonly uses—public AIS, some satellite imagery, scattered anonymous intelligence—each have blind spots.

In the report, Citrini gives a very straightforward judgment: “When there is a huge information gap in the market about whether the strait is ‘open or closed,’ the most direct and effective approach is only to count ships on site.”

This also explains why the report has drawn attention: it provides scarce first-hand observations, and the cost is extremely high personal risk.

From Dubai to Musandam: “high-risk evidence gathering”

Citrini’s route of investigation is written in detail: Dubai → Fujairah oil port → Oman’s Musandam Governorate (Khasab) → attempting to board a speedboat to enter the strait’s core waters.

The value of this route is that it allows him to observe the entire chain—“port—bunkering—border enforcement—maritime transit,” not just a stretch of water in the middle of the strait.

His equipment also doesn’t look like ordinary business travel: Leica zoom camera, recording glasses, an EPIRB emergency beacon, roughly $15k in cash. He also mentions bringing backup phones (including a Xiaomi phone) and supplies like Zyn.

The report includes clear on-the-ground phrasing. For example, he describes the trip as “like writing a research report into a waterproof bag,” always preparing for seizures and sudden situations.

Key finding one: AIS is “missing half,” with shadow AIS and “hidden corridors” filling in

One of Citrini’s most heavy conclusions is a direct blow to AIS reliability.

He writes: “Under the current environment, the AIS system fails to report about 50% of actual passing vessels each day, and the publicly available data that the market depends on is no longer reliable.” If you liken AIS to navigation on a highway, it can indeed show most vehicles—but when some vehicles “turn off their location” or take lesser-known roads that aren’t marked on public maps, the screen can look like it has large empty gaps.

During his on-site observations, he saw more vessels transiting—especially some choosing licensed passage routes near the Iranian coast, which he calls “hidden corridors.” Some vessels use dark AIS (turning off signals) or do not fully rely on publicly tracked systems.

For trading and risk management, this means a real-world problem: using public AIS estimates to judge whether “traffic is sharply declining” may likely underestimate actual transit volumes, thereby amplifying panic or mispricing-related risk premia.

To support this, shipping industry organizations like BIMCO—and some insurance and maritime bulletin channels (for example, the sailing safety bulletin system under UKMTO)—have long reminded that in high-risk waters, whether AIS is turned on often follows safety and avoidance strategies, so publicly available data naturally contains bias.

Citrini’s contribution is that he quantifies this “bias” into a more impactful approximate proportion.

Key finding two: IRGC-led “dynamic enforcement” makes the strait more like “temporary traffic control”

On the security and political front, the report emphasizes that the logic of control in the strait is changing.

He writes that the IRGC sets and enforces new transit rules on site, patrol boats and Shahed drones operate frequently, and the strait is in a “dynamic enforcement” state.

For an easier analogy, it’s a bit like a vital thoroughfare: the road isn’t fully blocked, but traffic police can set temporary lanes at any time, conduct spot checks, and manage lists of who gets to pass—transit experience and risk can swing on an hour-by-hour basis.

On sensitive issues, the report also leaves room for market interpretation: some security people in certain regions may believe that tightening control has legitimate border security and deterrence needs. What shipping companies and traders care about more is the unpredictability caused by the rules being temporary, because what supply chains fear most is not “expensive,” but “not knowing when they’ll get stuck.”

Inspections, detentions, and “signing commitments”: why this material comes at a high price

The most on-the-ground, vivid part of the report happens at an Oman border inspection checkpoint.

Citrini describes being asked to sign a commitment: “no filming, no engaging in journalism, no collecting intelligence.” After that, he rides on a speedboat driven by a stranger without GPS. The report says the speedboat is “only 18 miles from the Iranian coast,” even including details like “swimming in the strait and smoking cigars,” to illustrate just how close he is to the real shipping lanes and enforcement forces.

The more dramatic part is that he is intercepted and detained by Oman coast guards; his phone is confiscated, and his notes and photos may already have fallen into official hands.

For readers, the significance of these kinds of scenes isn’t sensationalism—it’s to explain a fact: as data sources become harder and publicly available information becomes more fragmented, the cost of first-hand observation is rising rapidly. That will directly affect the market’s information quality and pricing efficiency.

How should the market judge “strait risk” going forward?

A common question is: if publicly available AIS isn’t reliable, what else can the market trust?

A more realistic answer is: change from “single data source” to “multi-source jigsaw.” Trading and risk-control teams can cross-validate publicly available AIS, commercial satellites (especially SAR, which is friendlier to night and cloud cover), port loading/unloading and queue data, changes in insurance quotes, and official maritime bulletins. Think of it as using multiple cameras to watch the same intersection—when one camera is blocked, the whole still reconstructs the traffic trend.

Another question is: how will this affect oil prices and shipping?

Institutions like the EIA and the International Energy Agency (IEA) have repeatedly emphasized Hormuz’s importance. Risk premia often come from the product of “probability of disruption × impact of disruption.”

Citrini’s report improves the market’s understanding of the “impact” side: the strait isn’t showing a simple shutdown. Transit methods are changing, rules are more temporary, and risk is more like a “spike pulse.” The transmission of this kind of risk to options implied volatility, freight rates, and insurance surcharges is typically more sensitive than with spot transaction prices.

Volatility driven by “unpredictable temporary rules”

Citrini’s assessment of the future is cautious: IRGC-led on-site rules will make the strait more likely to see sudden friction, and volatility in the global oil supply chain may more frequently display characteristics like “short-lived, intense, hard to verify.” For the market, this kind of environment rewards participants who respond quickly and have more three-dimensional information sources.

His advice is also explicit: don’t treat the strait like a switch, and don’t treat AIS as the truth. The line in the report—“count ships on site”—is shocking precisely because it reminds the market that when information gaps are large enough, risk control and research need to get closer to ground reality, even if the cost is high and the risks are real.

In short, the core point of the report is that the actual transit volume through the Strait of Hormuz may be significantly higher than what publicly available AIS shows, the strait’s order displays a dynamic enforcement character, and any information that misjudges open/closed status could amplify volatility across the global energy and shipping chain.

On one hand, the market may need to recalibrate the mapping from “traffic to risk premium.” On the other hand, data methodologies will be forced to upgrade—from relying on a single public indicator to shifting toward multiple sources of validation, more expensive but more robust. For traders, shipping, and the industrial side, these changes will push “information advantage” into a more central position.