Deep Tide TechFlow News, February 20 — According to the GoPlus Chinese community, the prediction market platform Polymarket was hacked due to a design flaw in the synchronization mechanism between off-chain and on-chain transaction results in its order system. The attacker manipulated nonces to cause on-chain matched transactions to be canceled or invalidated before settlement, while off-chain records remained valid, leading to API false reports, affecting trading bots like Negrisk, and resulting in user losses.
The attack process is analyzed as follows:
The attacker submits/matches large reverse trades with a market-making bot on Polymarket’s off-chain order book.
The attacker constructs transactions with forged/repeated nonces or exploits on-chain nonce competition, causing on-chain transactions to inevitably revert.
Polymarket API returns “Trade Successful” to the bot before on-chain confirmation, leading the bot to believe positions are hedged, while the on-chain state has not yet changed.
The attacker then exploits the exposed direction of the bot with real on-chain transactions, achieving “risk-free” profit.
Since the revert occurs at the blockchain layer, Polymarket fees do not explode, making the attack cost manageable and sustainable.
GoPlus recommends users pause automated trading tools, verify on-chain transaction statuses, strengthen wallet security, and closely monitor official Polymarket announcements.
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GoPlus: Polymarket Hacked, Off-Chain and On-Chain Transaction Result Synchronization Mechanism Has Flaws
Deep Tide TechFlow News, February 20 — According to the GoPlus Chinese community, the prediction market platform Polymarket was hacked due to a design flaw in the synchronization mechanism between off-chain and on-chain transaction results in its order system. The attacker manipulated nonces to cause on-chain matched transactions to be canceled or invalidated before settlement, while off-chain records remained valid, leading to API false reports, affecting trading bots like Negrisk, and resulting in user losses.
The attack process is analyzed as follows:
The attacker submits/matches large reverse trades with a market-making bot on Polymarket’s off-chain order book.
The attacker constructs transactions with forged/repeated nonces or exploits on-chain nonce competition, causing on-chain transactions to inevitably revert.
Polymarket API returns “Trade Successful” to the bot before on-chain confirmation, leading the bot to believe positions are hedged, while the on-chain state has not yet changed.
The attacker then exploits the exposed direction of the bot with real on-chain transactions, achieving “risk-free” profit.
Since the revert occurs at the blockchain layer, Polymarket fees do not explode, making the attack cost manageable and sustainable.
GoPlus recommends users pause automated trading tools, verify on-chain transaction statuses, strengthen wallet security, and closely monitor official Polymarket announcements.