Speculations After Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei's Assassination

Removing emotions, political biases, and falsehoods, and attempting to infer the next steps based on political developments
For Iran:
1. Khamenei's death may not necessarily be a bad thing;
2. For Khamenei himself, martyrdom and sainthood within the religious community;
3. There is no longer a need to discuss surrender or resistance within Iran; there is no room for surrender factions now;
Therefore, Iran's counterattack this time is somewhat formal and interesting;
4. All along, Khamenei himself has been Iran's biggest flashpoint; he is too old. The issue of his successor is undoubtedly the most fundamental problem for Iran;
5. After Khamenei's death, Iran's regime will inevitably be extremely anti-American. The political righteousness of defending the homeland and avenging the leader is the easiest way to rise to power (unless the U.S. military occupies Iran, which is unlikely, given the nearly 100 million population and initial industrialization);
6. Khamenei himself has been the biggest surrenderist within Iran; Iran has always been so abstract, and as a leader, he had to bear the blame. As mentioned before, he is too old, and now he has died.
Regarding Israel and the U.S., they should be viewed separately:
1. Israel's strategy of dragging the U.S. into the water has been successful. Under the U.S. strategic contraction in North America, Israel might be abandoned (a clear political liability), but Israel absolutely will not allow this to happen;
2. Israel attacking Iranian leaders is extremely foolish, more like madness before destruction. Attacking leaders means fighting to the end, with no possibility of peace;
3. Israel is not strong; in fact, it is very weak. It relies on U.S. Middle East strategic interests and is a parasitic existence. When the U.S. can no longer dominate single-handedly, that will be the time Israel is destroyed;
4. Israel's Air Force and Army are two different things. The Air Force is essentially the U.S. Air Force, skilled at bullying the weak; the Army is at a militia level, struggling even against Gaza guerrillas, let alone other enemies.
The U.S. strategic benefit is a positive scheme: control oil, strengthen hegemony, and strike industrial nations (yes, us);
5. For the U.S., its strategic contraction should remain unchanged. It has shifted from comprehensive control to focused defense, with Israel in the Middle East being one of its strategic pivot points;
6. What is the U.S. strategic goal? That is a very interesting question.
Allow Iran to give up nuclear weapons? No (if that were true, there would be no conflict);
Overthrow the Iranian regime? That’s a method, not an end goal (a more anti-American regime would be even more absurd);
Establish a pro-Western puppet government? No (the U.S. cannot do that);
From a profit perspective: attacking Iran causes fluctuations in Iran’s oil and gas exports; the Strait of Hormuz could be blocked (20%-30% of global oil shipping routes); oil prices surge, increasing costs for industrial nations (us), reducing competitive advantage; U.S. shale oil and gas benefit, war profiteers benefit.
7. U.S. strategic speculation
The U.S. bets that it can pressure Iran this time, but it may not succeed.
If the U.S. cannot pressure Iran, or if Iran receives external support, and completely abandons surrender factions, insisting on attacking U.S. bases in the Middle East, the U.S. may not be able to handle it.
U.S. security maintenance costs will continue to rise. Initiating war is easy, but ending it is difficult. Politically, if the leader Khamenei is martyred and the regime is challenged, and the U.S. has no explanation, this conflict will be very hard to stop.