Recently, I’ve seen many people discuss hardware wallet security issues in the community, which made me realize that cases of cold wallet theft are more common than I thought. Many newcomers spend a lot of money to buy hardware wallets, thinking they can rest easy, but instead they become targets for scammers.

It’s quite ironic; the design logic of hardware wallets itself is sound—offline storage of private keys, secure chips for protection—these are industry-recognized security solutions. But the problem lies in the supply chain. Scammers don’t bother cracking the hardware itself; they start from the purchasing channel.

One recent case left a deep impression on me. Someone bought a hardware wallet from a third-party e-commerce platform, opened the package, followed the instructions to initialize it with the “initial PIN,” backed up the “mnemonic phrase,” and then transferred a large amount of funds. But it was quickly drained. Everything looked normal, but in reality, the manual was fake, and the wallet address was already controlled by the thief. The core method of cold wallet theft here is exploiting beginners’ lack of understanding of the usage process, using fake manuals for secondary packaging, and then selling through unofficial channels.

Similar risks are also common in Chinese-speaking regions. Imkey, a well-known manufacturer, has publicly warned that some unofficial shops sell already activated hardware wallets, with altered instructions, tricking users into depositing funds. This shows that recognizing official channels is just as important as identifying official websites.

There are even more outrageous cases. A Ledger user suddenly received a package they never ordered, containing a brand-new Ledger X and a letter. The letter claimed the company had been attacked, data leaked, and they sent a new device as a gesture. But Ledger’s CEO later clarified that the company would never do such compensation. When opening the device, obvious tampering marks were visible inside the plastic box. This is a typical hardware wallet modification scam.

Kaspersky’s security team also reported similar incidents: someone bought counterfeit Trezor Model T from unofficial channels, with the firmware already replaced, allowing attackers to access users’ crypto assets directly. A seemingly normal hardware wallet can actually become a tool for scammers.

Therefore, the risk of cold wallet theft mostly doesn’t come from technical breakthroughs but from human operational vulnerabilities. How to avoid it? It’s actually quite simple:

First, only buy from official channels. Any hardware wallet purchased from unofficial sources cannot guarantee security.

Second, ensure the device is in an uninitialized state. Officially sold devices should be brand new and not activated. If you find it has already been activated, with an “initial password” or “default address” on the manual, stop using it immediately and report to the official.

Third, perform all operations yourself. Setting the PIN, generating the binding code, creating addresses, backing up the mnemonic phrase—every step must be done by yourself. Any third-party operation in these steps is equivalent to handing over your private keys.

The proper process should be: the purchased hardware wallet is brand new and unactivated. When first using it, you should initialize the device, create the wallet, back up the mnemonic, and set the PIN—all by yourself. Following this process can greatly reduce the risk of cold wallet theft.

Ultimately, the security advantages of hardware wallets are real, but only if you use them correctly. In this scam-filled market environment, a little more caution means a little more protection.